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THE AGENCY OF THE PRESIDENT AND CABINET MEMBERS
UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The field of administrative law is almost as old as our Constitutional
form of government. From the very beginning of our national history there
was evidence that administrative tribunals or commissions would play an
important part in the development of our country. The report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure gives us an excellent historical picture:
.The administrative process is not new. On the contrary it is
as old as the Government itself; and its growth has been virtually
as steady as that of the Statutes at Large... Of the fifty-one administrative agencies in the Federal Government in 1941, no less
than eleven trace their beginnings to statutes enacted prior to the
Civil War. The first session of the First Congress enacted three
statutes conferring important administrative powers, two of which
are antecedents of statutes now administered by the Bureau of
Customs in the Treasury Department and the third of which initiated
the long series of pension laws now in the charge of the Veterans'
Administration." 1
James M. Landis pointed out the growing need for administrative agencies
in a speech delivered in Philadelphia in 1937:
"...Perhaps the most striking development of the last century in
governmental invention for the effectuation of policies is the administrative commission. The history of its origin and development in this country constitutes a most revealing chapter in human
affairs. The circumstances that led in 1887 to the creation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission are well known. First, there
was the realization of the need for regulation arising from the
complexity and significance of the development of the railroads,
and the abuses which attended this development. . .Secondly, there
was the breakdown of the common law procedures as applied to
these problems, of which two may be selected as outstanding -unreasonableness in rates and discrimination between persons and
communities. Some continuing supervision over the railroad problem as a whole was demanded, for it had become only too evident
that its solution could not be left to the casual and sporadic processes of private litigation.
The nature of this problem was perceived almost instinctively,
and it was solved almost instinctively. The administrative agency
1.

Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Sen. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 21 (1941).
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came into being not as a single comprehensive philosophical conception but by a process of empirical growth." 2
Recognizing the growing importance of the administrative agency, the
question remains whether the President of the United States and his Cabinet
Members are "agencies" within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. 3
A short introduction to the Act is in order. As has been pointed out, the
function of administrative tribunals has now become an integral part of our
form of government. The Supreme Court of the United States, through Mister
Justice Frankfurter, observes the "felt need of governmental supervision
over economic enterprise -- a supervision which could effectively be exercised neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial
process." 4
The initial outcries and misgivings concerning the administrative process
have now given way to the realization that it is here to stay. All that remained of the old criticism was the complete lack of uniformity in the procedure of the various agencies. This deficiency was corrected on June 11,
1946, when President Truman approved the law known as the Administrative
-Procedure Act. This bill was the final outcome of some ten years of serious
and conscientious study by the American Bar Association, interested scholars,
judges, and the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure.
All had an important role in the final construction of the bill. The legislative
history of the bill shows:
"... This situation has not been ignored by the Congress of the
United States. For ten years it has been considering legislation.
The difficulty has been the complexity of the subject, the disturbances of the times, and the world-shaking events in the international sphere. In considering the legislative proposals presented since 1933, the Congress has held many hearings and its
Committees have issued many reports on the subject.
The executive branch also has been concerned. The late President Roosevelt initiated or approved two major investigations on
the subject, both of which resulted in legislative recommendations
of far reaching consequence. Our great Attorney General, the
Honorable Tom Clark, has participated in the drafting of the present bill, and he has repeatedly endorsed it." 5
Attorney General Clark summed up the feelings on the subject when he said:
"June, 1946, the date on which the Administrative Procedure Act
was approved by the President, is notable in the history of the
governmental process. The Act sets a pattern designed to achieve
relative uniformity in the administrative machinery of the Federal
Government. It effectuates needed reforms in the administrative
process and at the same time preserves effectiveness of the laws
which are enforced by the administrative agencies of the Government." 6
2.
3.
4.

Landis, The Development of the Administrative Commission, an address before
the Swarthmore Club of Philadelphia, February 27, 1937.
60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. sec. 1001 (1946).
Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 142 (1940.

5. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1941).
6.

Att'y Gen. Manual, Ad. Proc. 5 (1947).
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What the bill does, in substance, may be stated under four headings: (1)
it provides that agencies must issue their rules of procedure; (2) it states
the essential forms of administrative proceedings and their limitations;
(3) it provides for administrative hearings in specified cases; and (4) it
sets forth a simplified statement concerning judicial review. Thus it can
be seen that the law as it now stands is an important piece of legislation.
How does this new legislation affect the President and members of his Cabinet?
The section of the Act with which this article is most concerned is section
2, subsection (a), which reads as follows:
"Sec. 2 (a) Agency - 'Agency' means each authority (whether or
not within or subject to review by another agency) of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts, or the
governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of
Columbia. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to repeal
delegations of authority as provided by law. Except as to the requirements of section 1002 of this title, there shall be excluded
from the operation of this Chapter (1) agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of
the parties to the disputes determined by them, (2) courts martial
and military commissions, (3) military or naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory, or (4)
functions which by law expire on the termination of present hostilities.

. ."

7

In any discussion concerning the President, reference must first be made
to the Constitution of the United States to ascertain what powers the President
has which are supreme in our tripartite form of government. Article H,
section 2 establishes that the President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy, that he can make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and that he may appoint certain officers by and with the consent of the Senate. These powers are so vested in the President that neither the legislature
nor the judiciary may interfere with them. Concerning these matters, the
President is not, nor can he be, an agency within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. To hold otherwise would be to give to the legislature
power which the Constitution never intended to give. It would, in effect, be
saying that Congress has the power to pass legislation by which it is able to
control the Executive branch of the government in its every function. That
each branch within the framework of the Federal Government is supreme
in its sphere of influence has been an established and accepted fact from the
beginning of our nation's history. The conclusion must be that where the
President acts solely by reason of the authority vested in him under Article
I1, section 2 of the Constitution none of the provisions of the Act apply to him.
The Act itself bears out this conclusion, declaring in Section 2, subsection
(a): "Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to repeal delegations of
authority as provided by Law." 8 The interpretation of this statement is that
the framers of the Act used this language in order to comply with the law as
it now stands. This seems clear and is substantiated by the statement of
the Senate Committee which helped draft the bill. 9 One eminent authority
makes an observation on this phase of the subject matter:
7.
8.
9.

60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. sec. 1001 et seq. (Supp. 1946).
Ibid.
See note 5 supra.
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"In the light of these realities it seems to me clear that the Act
should not be interpreted to modify the operation of some other
more specific statute, unless the statutory language is clearly
intended to accomplish that result." 10
In the case of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S.
189 (1928), Mister Justice Sutherland, at pages 201 and 202, sums up the
argument in these words:
"It may be stated then as a general rule inherent in the American
constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided
or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot
exercise either executive or legislative power."
It should be mentioned, however, that where the President issues an order
that the agencies which he formulates by reason of his constitutional authority
are to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act, the obvious result is
that the Act will apply. As the Act has been passed for the public good, such
an order by the President would be in complete accord with the best interests
of the country as a whole.
Another problem arises, however, when the President acts, not by reason
of his constitutional authority, but through legislative delegation. The Administrative Procedure Act makes no reference to this problem. The Congressional hearings concerning the Act make reference to it only once. During
the House Judiciary hearings, when Mr. Clyde B. Aitchison, Interstate Commerce Commissioner, was testifying, the following colloquy took place:
"Mr. Walter: May I direct your attention to the definition of
'Agency' made by the Attorney General's Committee on Page 4
of H.R. 1206, paragraph (a): 'Agency' means each office, board
commission, independent establishment, authority, corporation,
department, bureau, division, or other subdivision or unit of the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and means the highest or ultimate authority therein.
Mr. Aitchison: That certainly is more precise than section 2 as
we have it in H.R. 1203. Now, I want to ask this and split hairs
again; I find the courts are excluded from section 2. Is the President? He makes rules; he makes adjudications of the type which
are referred to in this Act. Now that is none of my business; I
am just a citizen and throw the question in for whatever it is worth.
I do not know what the intent is, of course.
Mr. Jennings: Well, if it operates to forbid the President from
operating as a legislative agency, I would say it is good law." 11
Referring to this discussion, a member of the New York Bar writes:
"No indication as to whether the President is included within the
term 'agency' is made. Since both Congress and the courts are
L. Rev.
10. Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 Ill.

368, 421 (1946).
11. See note 5 supra, at 123.
- 132

-

specifically excluded, it may well be inferred that when the President acts in the capacity of an administrative office the Act applies to him." 12
Under these circumstances the President falls under the classification of
'agency' within the meaning of the Act. The Act declares in Section 2, subsection (a) that 'agency' is defined as 'each authority', and that in subsection
(b),'person' includes 'individuals'. 13
Most of the agencies in the Federal Government today were created either
expressly or impliedly by Congress.
"As a general rule, administrative agencies are of statutory
origin, and their rights, duties, powers, and privileges are expressly or impliedly set forth in the statute creating them. Sometimes, however, the agencies are set up by executive order, but
even in cases of this kind the order is promulgated pursuant to
a statute. Examples of the latter type of agency are the Farm
Credit Administration and the Federal Housing Administration." 14
In these cases the President is directly or indirectly an agency within
the meaning of the Act. Consideration of the statute which created the Federal Housing Administration may be in order:
"The President is authorized to create a Federal Housing Administration, all the powers of which shall be exercised by a Federal Housing Administrator . ..who shall be appointed by the
President by and with the advice of the Senate, shall hold office
for a term of four years and shall be paid compensation at the
rate of $15,000 per annum. . ." 15
It is obvious that Congress gave to the President complete power to establish a Federal Housing Administration. The President, by executive order,
appointed an administrator to carry out the program as established and desired by the Chief Executive. In this instance, clearly, the President indirectly, and the administrator directly, are agencies with the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act and must comply with its provisions.
"... (A)gencies, necessarily, cannot be defined by mere form
such as departments, boards, etc. If agencies were defined, by
form rather than by the criterion of authority, it might result
in the unintended inclusion of mere 'housekeeping' functions or
the exclusion of those who have the real power to act." 16
The above quoted paragraph is strong evidence that the legislators intended
the widest possible interpretation of the word "agency" in order to bring all
agencies within the purview of the Act. The President has the "authority" to
control the Federal Housing Administrator and must be an agency within the
meaning of the Act. There is no reason why the President should be given a
status different from that of all the other agency heads who fall within its
scope. Certainly, it cannot be said that to do so will place upon him any undue
12.
13.
14.
15.

Carrow, The Background of Administrative Law 4 (1948).
See note 5 supra, at 196.
Siriver, How to Find the Law of Administrative Agencies 4 (1940).
48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. sec. 1702 (Supp. 1946).

16. See note 5 supra, at 253.
- 133

-

burden. The facts would seem to indicate the opposite conclusion, considering that the late President Roosevelt appointed investigatory committees to
delve into the problems of administrative procedure, and that President
Truman signed the bill approving the Act. There is little doubt that the Presidents wholeheartedly agreed to conform to its provisions.
By an Act of Congress, passed August 8, 1950,17 the President is authorized to provide for the performance of certain of his functions by other officers of the government. By this "Delegation Act" he is allowed to ". . .designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive
branch or any official thereof. ..,to perform without approval, ratification,
or other action by the President. . ." 18 any of the functions vested in him
by law and similar functions of the officers under him.
What is the effect of this new law with reference to the agency of the
President? Does it minimize the application of the Administration Procedure
Act to him as an agency? In some respects it does, insofar as he may freely
"without approval, ratification, or other action" *delegate his powers. The
department head receiving the delegated powers becomes directly responsible
for conformance with the provisions of the Act. It leaves the President indirectly responsible. It must be pointed out, however, that only by specific
grant of authority from the legislature is he vested with this new "power of
delegation". It is not derived from his Constitutional authority. It follows,
therefore, that he is still an agency within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
A further question to be answered is whether a Cabinet Member is an
agency within the meaning of the Act. To answer this question, the Secretary
of Agriculture will be used as an example.
That the Act applies to the Department of Agriculture is pointed out in
the Act at Section 2, subsection (a), which defines agency as:
"...each authority (whether or not within or subject to review
by another agency) of the government of the United States other
than Congress, the Courts, or the Governments of the Possessions,
Territories, or the District of Columbia." 19
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in reference to the problem of agency,
while debating the passage of the bill declared:
"It is necessary to define agency as 'authority' rather "than by
name or form, because of the present system of including one
agency within another or of authorizing internal boards or divisions to have final authority. 'Authority' means any officer or
board, whether within another agency or not, which by law has
authority to take final and binding action with or without appeal
to some superior administrative authority. Thus 'divisions' of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the so-called Schwellenbach Offices of the Department of Agriculture would be
'agencies' within the definition." 20
The Secretary of Agriculture is an agency within the meaning of the Act as
long as he can take "full" and "final" action on matters coming before the
various agencies established by the Department of Agriculture. Evidence
17. Pub. L. No. 673, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 1 (Aug. 8, 1950).
18. Ibid.

19. See note 7 supra.
20. See note 5 supra, at 13.
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that he has such power is indicated in the following example given by the
Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture:
"Milk is one of the commodities subject to the provisions of the
Act (Agricultural Marketing Agreement) and its marketing is being
regulated by orders of the Secretary in twenty-nine milk marketing areas.
The procedure for issuing a milk certificate is as follows:
whenever the Secretary believes that the issuance of an order
will tend to effectuate the policy of the Act, notices are given of
a public hearing on the proposed program and at such hearing all
interested persons are given an opportunity to be heard. If the
Secretary determines upon the basis of the evidence introduced
at the hearing that the issuance of the order will tend to effectuate
the purpose of the Act, he makes a finding to that effect. A tentative marketing order is then submitted to the handlers of milk
within the area for signature, and the proposed order is submitted to the producers of such milk for such approval. If the
handlers of fifty per cent or more of the milk marketed within
the area sign the agreement, and if at least two-thirds of the producers or the producers of at least two-thirds of the milk marketed
in the area approve the order, it may become effective. The order may also be issued if the necessary approval of the producers
is obtained and the Secretary finds, with the approval of the President, that the refusal of the handlers to sign the agreement tends
to prevent the effectuation of the policy of the Act and that the
issuance of the order is the only practicable means of accomplishing that result." 21
The above example brings out clearly and forcibly the power of the Secretary. He has the "full" and "final" authority to decide whether an order
will issue. He is the responsible person, the actor, as it were, or as is
stated in the Act itself, the "authority" for issuing marketing orders. It
follows that because he has such authority, he comes directly within the
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act as an agency.
F. Trowbridge vom Baur, referring to the Executive department, observes
that ".... only the officer or group designated constitutes the administrative
agency and must discharge its functions independently of duties as a member of the executive department." 22 Clearly, this is authority for concluding
that no attempt is being made by the legislature to interfere with the Executive branch of the government as such. ". . . (T)he (Administrative Procedure) Act quickens our sense of responsibility toward achievements of
sound government. In the Department of Agriculture, every effort is being
made to conform fully with the letter and spirit of the law." 23
To summarize: (1) Where the President acts under his Constitutional
authority, havincr no reference to any specific or general grant from the
legislature, he is not an agency within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act; (2) Where the President acts under a general or specific
grant of authority from the legislature, he is an agency within the meaning
of the Administrative Procedure Act; (3) A Cabinet Member is an agency
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.
_John G. Salatka
21. Hunter, The Administrative Procedure Act in its Application to the Functions of

the Department of Agriculture 4 (1947).
22. vom Baur, 1 Federal Administrative Law 95 (1942).
23. See note 21 supra, at 43.
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